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Abstract
The anterior medial prefrontal (AMPFC) and retrosplenial (RSC) cortices are active during self-
referential decision-making tasks such as when participants appraise traits and abilities, or current
affect. Other appraisal tasks requiring an evaluative decision or mental representation, such as theory
of mind and perspective-taking tasks, also involve these regions. In many instances, these types of
decisions involve a subjective opinion or preference, but also a degree of ambiguity in the decision,
rather than a strictly veridical response. However, this ambiguity is generally not controlled for in
studies that examine self-referential decision-making. In this functional MRI (fMRI) experiment with
seventeen healthy adults, we examined neural processes associated with subjective decision-making
with and without an overt self-referential component. The task required subjective decisions about
colors—regarding self-preference (internal subjective decision) or color similarity (external
subjective decision) under conditions where there was no objectively correct response. Results
indicated greater activation in the AMPFC, RSC, and caudate nucleus during internal subjective
decision-making. The findings suggest that self-referential processing, rather than subjective
judgments among ambiguous response alternatives, accounted for the AMPFC and RSC response.
Introduction
An increasing number of studies in the cognitive and affective neurosciences are focused on
the subjective self (Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Functional neuroimaging studies on self-referential
tasks are finding similar activation patterns involving the anterior medial prefrontal cortex
(AMPFC) and the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Vogeley & Fink,
2003). Relevant experimental imaging paradigms include those in which the participant rates
the self or an ‘other’ on abilities/traits (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Schmitz,
Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004; Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2002; Zysset,
Huber, Samson, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2003), rates one's affective response to connotative
pictures (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997)
or words (Cato et al., 2004; Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003), or evaluates personal
preferences (Paulus & Frank, 2003; Seger, Stone, & Keenan, 2004). Theory of mind paradigms
(Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 1999; Goel, Grafman, Sadato, & Hallett, 1995) in which
the participant infers the mind content/intentions of another, have also found activation in the
AMPFC and RSC. All of these tasks have in common a meta-cognitive component (Stuss,
Picton, & Alexander, 2001), comprising the participant's subjective appraisal rather than a
veridical criterion-based decision (see also Zysset et al., 2002). For example, Seger et al.
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(2004) presented 144 food names and asked participants to decide with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response
whether they preferred the food. In another condition the subjects decided whether someone
they were familiar with preferred the food. This type of task is dependent on the completeness
of knowledge about the self and the other, and secondly on the strength of the preference. In
forced-choice scenarios such as this, when veridical knowledge may be incomplete, or when
there is a degree of uncertainty among response alternatives, the choice selection becomes
subjective because each response alternative has some degree of plausibility. Similarly, when
strong beliefs or preferences (like or dislike) have not yet been formed, or when there is
ambivalence between the choices, the response again becomes more subjective or arbitrary,
and less criterion-based. Ambiguity or uncertainty between response alternatives is therefore
a possible component of many self-referential or other meta-representational functional
imaging experiments. Although the studies cited above have found common regions of
activation, the problem of ambiguity among choice alternatives (and thus subjectivity in
responses) has not been adequately addressed as a factor that may be accounting for AMPFC
and RSC activity. Thus, strong conclusions regarding the functional nature of this network
cannot yet be made.
In the present study we sought to test whether nonveridical (i.e. subjective) decisions, with or
without a salient self-referential component, could account for AMPFC and/or RSC
involvement. We therefore asked seventeen healthy young adult participants to make decisions
regarding color preference and color similarity during fMRI, using a paradigm in which
subjective choice between two equally plausible alternatives was required. A color preference
condition is described here as an ‘internal’ subjective decision (ISD) task because it had an
inward or self-referential context. A subjective color similarity condition was termed the
‘external’ subjective decision (ESD) because the choice between two equivocal alternatives
was based on the external color properties of the color stimuli rather than on self-preference.
Because blood oxygen dependent (BOLD) fMRI is a relative measure, the choice of the
baseline task is critical to making valid interpretations of the results. Recent research has
indicated that low-level baseline conditions (such as rest or crosshair fixation) activate the
MPFC and RSC, perhaps due to the participant being more self-aware of their immediate
surroundings or performance in the experiment during nondemanding activities (Greicius &
Menon, 2004; Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Thus, a low-level baseline task
such as crosshair fixation was avoided in this study, as it may implicitly be self-referential.
The baseline condition for this study involved making veridical color similarity decisions in
which one of the choice alternatives was unambiguously correct. This was termed the external
veridical decision (EVD) condition. The key comparison between the two ambiguous
conditions was achieved with a random-effects group analysis. Our hypothesis was that the
midline structures would be more active during internal (self-referential) subjective decision-
making.
Results
Reaction times for the three conditions were as follows EVD: Avg = .977 ms, SD = .280; ESD:
Avg = 1.717 ms, SD =.388; ISD: Avg= 1.671 ms, SD=.446. Repeated measures ANOVA
indicated the means were significantly different (p<.001). The two subjective conditions were
significantly different from the veridical condition (ESD vs EVD: t[16]=10.71, p<.001; ISD
vs EVD: t[16]=7.25, p<.001), but they were not significantly different from each other (ESD
versus ISD t[16]=.865, p=ns).
ESD vs. EVD Activation
The fMRI signal difference between the two external color similarity conditions was computed
using a paired t-test random-effects model. The result is shown in the statistical parametric
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map in Figure 2. The voxel locations and associated t-statistics and FDR corrected p-values of
the maxima are in Table 1. The contrast resulted in activation of the dorsal medial frontal
cortex, just dorsal to the mid-cingulate. The intraparietal sulcus was active bilaterally, as was
the dorsolateral and inferolateral frontal lobe and anterior insula. Neither the anterior medial
prefrontal cortex or the retrosplenial cortex were significant in this comparison.
ISD vs. EVD Activation
A very similar pattern was shown when the ISD condition was compared to the baseline EVD
condition. This contrast is presented in Figure 3 and Table 2.
ISD vs. ESD Activation: Internal versus external subjective decisions
The key comparison in this study was between the two subjective conditions. The result is
shown in the statistical parametric map in Figure 4 and plot in Figure 5. Table 3 contains the
voxel locations and statistics. The left anterior medial prefrontal cortex and the retrosplenial
cortex were each differentially more active during the internal subjective decision compared
to the external subjective decision. Also active in this contrast were the head of the caudate
bilaterally, the left posterior temporal cortex, and the left anterior hippocampus.
Discussion
In this experiment we found that self-referential (internal) subjective decision-making
activated the AMPFC and RSC significantly more than an external subjective decision-making
comparison task. These results suggest that the cerebral response to subjective decision-making
is dependent on the referent of the task but not ambiguity.
Self-referential decision-making (ISD)
In the key comparison of ISD versus ESD, the AMPFC was relatively more active on the left,
as was the caudate, RSC, and posterolateral temporal lobe. The AMPFC and RSC findings
supported our primary hypothesis; the regions were active when a subjective choice had a self-
referent, but not when the referent was external. This finding supports the growing body of
literature for a meta-representational network invoked by self-referential tasks (Frith & Frith,
1999; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Goel et al., 1995; Gusnard et al., 2001; Gusnard et al., 2003;
Johnson et al., 2002; Maddock, 1999; Schmitz et al., 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001; Zysset et al.,
2002). In addition, the posterolateral temporal lobe has also been reported to be active for these
types of tasks (Frith & Frith, 1999). Why the left hemisphere was more active than the right is
not completely clear. Prior studies (in which ambiguity was not controlled, e.g. Johnson et al.,
2002) have not found strongly lateralized effects. However, Turk and colleagues (Turk et al.,
2002; Turk, Heatherton, Macrae, Kelley, & Gazzaniga, 2003) have studied self recognition in
split brain patients and suggest that the integrative and interpretive functions of the left
hemisphere (Gazzaniga, 2000) provide an advantage for self-recognition performance. That
finding is consistent with the self-referential effect observed in the present study, but clearly
more work is needed in this regard.
Goldberg and Podell have postulated that common goal-directed but nonveridical self-
referential decisions (e.g. selecting from a menu at a restaurant or choosing which clothes to
wear) involve the frontal lobes (Goldberg & Podell, 1999, 2000). Furthermore they have shown
with an elegant behavioral paradigm that frontal lobe injury can be distinguished from normal
functioning on a cognitive bias task, in which subjective choice preference is measured
(Goldberg & Podell, 2000; Podell, Lovell, Zimmerman, & Goldberg, 1995). Although our
experiment was quite different from Goldberg's in many respects including behavioral versus
imaging methodology, subject population, and paradigm, there is some conceptual similarity.
Further, the results of the present study demonstrate robust dorsomedial as well as dorsolateral
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frontal lobe activation in each of the subjective conditions relative to the EVD veridical baseline
decision task. This is consistent with Goldberg's findings in patients with frontal lobe lesions
(Goldberg & Podell, 1999).
Regarding the contrast of the two external conditions, we note that a variety of regions were
active. The ESD condition likely differed from the EVD condition in more than one way. First,
the reaction times differed; the ESD condition had longer reaction times, suggesting greater
difficulty and attentional demand. The dorsal medial frontal and intraparietal findings have
been commonly implicated in studies of attention, inclusive of working memory (Nelson,
Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides, & Smith, 2003; Smith & Jonides, 1999), conflict monitoring
and cognitive control (Carter, MacDonald, Ross, & Stenger, 2001; Kerns et al., 2004; van
Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001). Dorsomedial prefrontal activation has also
been reported by Gusnard et al. (2001) during an ‘external’ decision making task in which the
decision was whether a visual scene was indoors or outdoors.
The finding in the inferior frontal gyrus, left more than right on both the subjective tasks relative
to the EVD baseline, may reflect a verbal reasoning strategy during those conditions that may
not have been employed during the less difficult EVD condition. This is, however, a speculative
interpretation based on the location of the finding around Broca's area, and the longer reaction
times for the subjective conditions.
The bilateral anterior insula response during each of the subjective tasks is intriguing. A recent
fMRI report found activation here, right more than left, when subjects were asked to perform
an interoceptive awareness task—being mindful of their own heartbeat (Critchley, Wiens,
Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). This region has been suggested by Craig (2003) to be
involved in the meta-representation of interoceptive feelings and is more active when the
stimuli are perceived as more emotionally intense (Craig, 2002). Damasio (1999) also supports
this conclusion. In addition, Phan et al. (2004) report bilateral anterior insula activation during
a self-referential task, more so when stimuli were perceived as more emotionally intense. As
Phan et al. (2004) discuss, the anterior insula may be evoked by the emotional salience of a
task. In the current study, although the task was not intended to be emotionally evocative,
perhaps the ambiguity of the subjective conditions resulted in an unintended affective response,
thus explaining insula activity during both subjective (ESD and ISD) conditions compared to
the EVD condition. A limitation of the current study is that we did not have other physiological
measures to parallel the fMRI paradigm. Galvanic skin conductance for example may have
helped determine whether the affective arousal of either of the subjective tasks was correlated
with the cerebral response in the insula.
Retrieval and the Retrosplenial Cortex
The RSC is consistently active during episodic retrieval (Cabeza, Dolcos, Graham, & Nyberg,
2002; Piefke, Weiss, Zilles, Markowitsch, & Fink, 2003). Since prior studies of self-referential
decision making also commonly activate the RSC, we sought to avoid retrieval demands in
our task design. For example, Johnson et al. (2002) asked participants to rate themselves on
attributes and abilities and found activation in the RSC. Potentially, participants in that study
could have engaged in retrieval of schemata they have about themselves regarding the trait or
ability in question (analogous to calling to mind ‘personal’ semantic knowledge); or they could
have called to mind specific episodes from the past to support their answers. Other relevant
studies have similar potential retrieval demands that could account for the retrosplenial
activation (Kelley et al., 2002; Schmitz et al., 2004; Zysset et al., 2002). By avoiding explicit
retrieval of schematic and episodic memory in the current task design, we can state more
confidently that the RSC finding in this study is attributable to the referent rather than incidental
episodic retrieval processes.
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The interaction between episodic retrieval and self-referential processing is deserving of further
work since the RSC is often reported as activating to both types of tasks. The importance of
gaining this understanding is underscored by the fact that the RSC is hypometabolic in
Alzheimer's Disease (AD) (Matsuda, 2001; Minoshima, Foster, & Kuhl, 1994; Minoshima et
al., 1997) as well as in people with risk factors for AD (Reiman et al., 1996; Reiman et al.,
2004; Small et al., 2000). In addition to diminished memory and cognitive abilities, there is a
concomitant lack of appreciation, or self-awareness, for such memory and cognitive deficits
(Duke, Seltzer, Seltzer, & Vasterling, 2002; Rymer et al., 2002; Tabert et al., 2002). A
diminished sense of awareness is also frequently observed in other diseases with a predominant
frontal lobe etiology such as frontal lobe dementia (Miller et al., 2001), traumatic brain injury
(Flashman, Amador, & McAllister, 1998; Flashman & McAllister, 2002; Prigatano, 1996;
Sherer et al., 1998) and schizophrenia (Flashman et al., 2001). One potentially fruitful area of
investigation will be to determine whether diseases with predominant RSC involvement will
show a different pattern of self-referential deficits than diseases with predominant frontal lobe
etiology (Rombouts et al., 2003). These important issues have yet to be studied.
A default network for self
Task induced deactivations (TIDs) have been reported recently to occur in the AMPFC and
RSC. TIDs refer to increased activity during low-demand baseline tasks relative to the
experimental task in fMRI and PET studies (Greicius & Menon, 2004). A low level baseline
has many conceptual advantages, if one can assume that it is a physiologically and
psychologically neutral condition. The plot in Figure 5 indicates that this was not the case for
our baseline condition; the easier EVD condition evoked more signal in the RSC than the
subjective tasks. Several investigators (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Lustig et al., 2003; Raichle
et al., 2001) have interpreted TIDs as resulting from a default mode in which the participant is
more self-aware of the ‘here and now’ of the experiment, their surroundings, and their
performance. Easier task conditions, including rest, in fMRI and PET studies may facilitate
this type of awareness (D'Argembeau et al., 2005). Many studies of observer effects on
performance (e.g. Kazdin, 1982) demonstrate that performance differs base on whether one is
aware of being observed, perhaps due to increased self-monitoring. Thus, it may be that
AMPFC and RSC ‘default mode’ findings are explainable by these social psychological
processes. This hypothesis remains to be studied with modern brain mapping techniques and
integrated social psychological theory (Cacioppo et al., 2003). Research with quantitative
blood flow imaging methods are also needed since BOLD fMRI only measures relative signal
change between conditions and is therefore not suited to fully explain the concept of
deactivation.
Limitations
This study had some limitations that should be considered. The experimental design of this
study did not allow us to completely test the self-referential effect. The design had veridical
and subjective conditions for external decisions, but the internal decisions were always
subjective. Although the results of the study allow us to conclude that there was a self-
referential effect while controlling for ambiguity, an additional condition for veridical self-
referential decisions would have allowed us to determine whether there was a main effect for
self-referential processing or an interaction with ambiguity in the midline structures. A second
limitation is our ability to isolate self-referential processing to the internal (preference)
condition. The external subjective decision, which was always a choice between two equally
plausible alternatives, may have also involved implicit self-referential decision-making to
some degree. While this cannot be ruled out, any self-referential processing in the ESD
condition was likely to be less than the explicitly self-referential ISD condition. This is borne
out by the result of the key comparison between ISD and ESD showing regions relatively more
active during the overtly self-referential condition.
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In conclusion, this study sought to determine the neural response during subjective decision-
making with and without a self-referential component. The findings confirmed our hypothesis
that subjective decision making alone does not account for the frequently observed AMPFC
and RSC results in prior self-referential brain activation paradigms. Thus, the results provide
further support for a self-referential brain network (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Northoff &
Bermpohl, 2004). Future functional imaging studies involving patients with either impaired
self-referential capacities, or known damage within this network, will likely facilitate our
understanding of this system. Such work is underway in our laboratory.
Methods
Seventeen healthy young adult right-handed participants (9 male and 8 female) were included
in this study (mean age= 21.3, SD=2.4; mean education =15.3, SD=1.3). The participants were
recruited from the University of Wisconsin—Madison campus via advertisement. Prior to
study procedures, participants were screened in a phone interview for MRI safety/compatibility
and questioned regarding general health history. The exclusion criteria consisted of color
blindness, any chronic medical condition (e.g. neurological, cardiovascular, cancer), prior
invasive surgical procedures, incidence of head trauma involving loss of consciousness for
more than 5 minutes, prior diagnosis of a major psychiatric disorder, history of alcohol/
substance abuse, learning disability, or vision/hearing impairment. All prescription
medications (with the exception of stable oral contraceptives) were excluded. Participants who
met criteria provided written informed consent prior to engaging in study procedures. On the
day of the scan, participants were administered a brief set of neuropsychological tests including
the Wide Range Achievement Test-Third Edition (WRAT-III) Reading Recognition subtest (a
quick estimate of verbal intelligence) to verify that broad cognitive abilities were within normal
ranges. The average score from these participants was 111, SD= 5. The population average on
this test is 100 with a population SD of 15. The participants were compensated for taking part
in this Institutional Review Board approved study.
Task
Stimulus Characteristics—The general configuration of the stimuli is depicted in Figure
1. Three colored squares were presented simultaneously on the screen. A new set of squares
appeared every 4 seconds for the course of the experiment, but the general stimulus
characteristics, spatial layout and motoric and perceptual demands were the same for all three
conditions in the task. The only factors that differed were the type of choice to be made (color
similarity or preference decision). The color luminance was always equal for the two choice
alternatives in all three conditions. This was achieved by manipulating the Red, Green and
Blue (RGB) components of the colors.
On a 800 × 600 screen layout, the target or referent square was centered 150 pixels above the
two choice alternatives, which were situated 120 pixels to the left and right of center. The
squares were all 90 × 90 in size. A semantic cue was present at the bottom of the screen to
remind the subject of the current condition. The response selection of the left or right square
was made on a two-button response panel placed in the right hand. The match was either by
similarity or preference depending on the condition. Three conditions were presented:
Condition 1—Internal Subjective Decision or ISD: During this condition the colors were
always equally distant in color hue and luminance from the referent. The match decision was
based on self-preference, in the moment, rather than on color similarity. The decision was thus
subjective and ‘internal’ or self-referential.
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Condition 2—External Subjective Decision or ESD: During this condition the two
alternatives were different from each other, but equidistant from the target in color hue and
luminance. Thus, the choice of which of the two alternatives was more similar to the target
was entirely ambiguous and subjective since there was no apparent correct answer based on
external color features.
Condition 3—External Veridical Decision or EVD: During the EVD condition, a correct
answer was always apparent. The correct answer occurred equally often in the left and right
position. This was the baseline condition and was employed to control for visuospatial
complexity, color identification and processing, the motoric and attentional components of
choice selection.
Task Design—The conditions occurred in epochs of 20 seconds and five decision trials (four
seconds each) were presented in each epoch. The order of the three conditions was
pseudorandom and all three occurred within each of five 60-second cycles. The task was 5
minutes 40 seconds duration. The condition order was the same for all subjects. A semantic
reminder was always at the bottom of the screen: “which is more similar” or “which do you
prefer.” In addition, a four-second instructional cue was presented whenever the task switched
from/to similarity to/from preference. The instruction cue at the beginning of the similarity
conditions (conditions 2 or 3) was “which of the bottom boxes is more similar in color to the
top box?” The instruction set for condition 1 was “which of the bottom boxes do you prefer
with the top box.” Participants were instructed to make their decision as rapidly as possible
using the MRI-compatible response device.
Setup Procedures and Hardware
Participants were provided with instruction and practice prior to scanning. They were then
situated on the bed of a GE long bore 3.0 Tesla scanner and outfitted with the MR-compatible
button-box and a high-resolution goggle system, set at 800 × 600 from Resonance Technology
(Northridge, CA, USA). Head motion was constrained by foam padding around the head. The
software Presentation (http://www.neurobs.com) was used to deliver visual stimuli from a PC
computer via the goggle system and also record responses through the button-box connected
to the serial port of the stimulus-delivery computer. A coaxial cable connecting the scanner
control computer to the stimulus delivery computer enabled Presentation to monitor the pulses
from the scanner, thereby enabling precise synchrony between slice acquisition and stimulus
delivery.
Imaging protocol
Prior to the functional MRI scan, higher order shimming was performed using software
provided by the manufacturer. The routine is run iteratively 2−3 times per subject resulting in
field homogeneity over the brain in the range of 15−23 Hz RMS.
Field Mapping—Even after high-order shimming, there is residual magnetic field (Bo)
inhomogenities across the brain that cause regional image distortions in echo planar images
such as in the inferior prefrontal regions near the frontal and ethmoid sinuses. Since this was
a relevant region for this experiment, image distortions were corrected by measuring 3D field
maps across the brain (co-planar with the fMRI slices). This was accomplished by measuring
the phase of non-EPI gradient echo images at two echo times (7 and 10 ms). The phase
difference between the two echo images is proportional to the static field inhomogeneity
(Jezzard & Balaban, 1995). The warp correction was performed using custom software
developed in Matlab. A 3D phase-unwrapping algorithm (based on Jenkinson, 2003) was used
to estimate the continuous field map. Image unwarping was performed using a nonlinear pixel
shifting and B splines interpolation algorithm.
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Image Acquisition—For each subject, a T2* weighted gradient-echo echo-planar image
(EPI) pulse sequence was prescribed for the functional trials. The EPI parameters were as
follows: echo time (TE) = 30 ms; repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms; flip angle = 90°; acquisition
matrix = 64 × 64 voxels; field of view (FOV) = 240 mm. Thirty sagittal slices of the brain were
acquired within the TR at each time point, with a voxel resolution of 3.75 × 3.75 × 4 mm, and
a 1 mm skip between slices. Over a 5 min 40 s scanning run, 170 time points were collected,
of which 3 images acquired during the first 6 s were discarded. Subsequent to the functional
scans, a 3D IR-prepped fast gradient echo pulse sequence was administered (7.5 minutes) to
provide high-resolution T1-weighted structural images.
Image Processing
Following echo-planar image reconstruction the files were converted to Analyze7.5 file format
and reoriented to the axial plane. The 4D image time-series was motion-corrected to overcome
minor head movement during the scan. The field map described above was then applied to
each image in the time series to correct for echo-planar related distortions in image space. The
images were then normalized into MNI standard atlas space (using the EPI template provided
through SPM2), and then smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Data Analysis
Statistical analyses of the time-series data were performed on individual participants using a
boxcar model convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. The statistical
model included high frequency signal filtering (high pass filter = 128 seconds) and low-pass
filtering with the hemodynamic response function. The time series data were statistically
analyzed using the general linear model using SPM2 (Friston et al., 1995). Three contrasts
were specified per single-participant analysis: ESD versus EVD, ISD versus EVD, and ISD
versus ESD.
The resultant single-participant contrast images were then entered into second-level random
effects analyses for this group of 17 subjects. Inference on the statistical significance of these
group analyses used corrected p-values with the False Discovery Rate method (Genovese,
Lazar, & Nichols, 2002) of p < 0.05 or lower.
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The spatial layout of the stimuli for this experiment. In frames A and B, the square above the
horizontal line is the target or referent; the bottom two squares are the choice alternatives that
must be matched to the target based on color preference, or color similarity. The colors are
actual examples from the experiment. The choice alternatives in Frame A are equidistant from
each other, and equally similar to the referent. The saturation and luminance were also equal.
This type of ambiguous stimulus is representative of the two subjective conditions ISD and
ESD. The red green blue (RGB) values for the colors are as follows (counterclockwise from
the top): 90,180,180; 180,90,180; 180,180,90. Frame B is representative of the EVD control
condition in which the participant made a veridical decision about which of the two color
choices was most similar to the target. The RGB values in Frame B are: 255,100,100;
255,150,150; 51,51,255.
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SPM[t] contrast of ESD versus EVD conditions. The map in this figure has a statistical
threshold of p<.02 using the false discovery rate correction procedure described in the text.
Rendered views of the left and right hemisphere are shown in A and B respectively. C is a mid-
sagittal view, and D is an axial view just below the commissures. See Table 1 for cluster
locations and voxel level statistics.
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SPM[t] contrast of ISD versus EVD conditions. The statistical map in this figure has a statistical
threshold of p<.02 using the false discovery rate correction procedure described in the text.
Rendered views of the left and right hemisphere are shown in A and B respectively. C is a mid-
sagittal view, and D is an axial view just below the commissures. See Table 2 for cluster
locations and voxel level statistics.
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SPM[t] contrast of ISD versus ESD conditions. The results are thresholded at a statistical
threshold of .02 FDR corrected. Rendered views of the left and right hemisphere are shown in
A and B respectively. C is a mid-sagittal view depicting AMPFC and RSC activation. D-E are
axial views. See Table 3 for cluster locations and voxel-level statistics.
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Plot of the eigenvariate of signal change averaged over seven voxels defined by a 2mm radius
sphere in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (coordinate −12, 50, 34) and retrosplenial cortex
(−8, −40, 32) for ISD and ESD conditions relative to the EVD condition. Error bars represent
the standard error.
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Table 1
Statistics and locations for ESD versus EVD contrast.
p(FDR) T x,y,z (mm) Region
0.003 9.35 −44 28 18 Left inferior frontal gyrus
0.003 7.67 −30 22 −8 Left anterior insula
0.003 7.29 0 24 44 Dorsomedial frontal cortex
0.003 7.27 24 −76 40 Right posterior parietal and lateral occipital cortex
0.004 6.41 32 −64 −16 Right inferior temporal-occipital cortex
0.004 6.52 36 26 −8 Right anterior insula
0.004 6.31 −26 −70 36 Left intraparietal sulcus
0.004 5.96 48 10 22 Right inferior frontal gyrus
0.005 5.59 32 0 54 Right middle frontal gyrus
0.007 4.96 −38 −80 −12 Left inferior temporal-occipital cortex
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Table 2
Statistics and locations for ISD versus EVD contrast.
p(FDR-cor) T x,y,z (mm) Region
<.001 10.25 30 −74 36 Right posterior parietal and lateral occipital
<.001 8.38 −48 20 16 Left inferior frontal gyrus
<.001 8.22 −32 18 58 Left middle frontal gyrus
<.001 8.28 −28 −72 34 Left posterior parietal and lateral occipital
<.001 8.11 34 2 54 Right middle frontal gyrus
<.001 8.06 2 26 42 Dorsomedial frontal cortex
<.001 7.47 −30 26 −6 Left anterior insula
0.001 7.03 48 10 22 Right inferior frontal gyrus
0.001 6.84 8 −78 −28 Cerebellum near midline
0.001 6.20 36 −72 −30 Right cerebellum
0.001 5.55 48 40 8 Right inferior frontal gyrus
0.004 4.49 34 18 −2 Right anterior insula
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Table 3
Statistics and locations for ISD versus ESD contrast
p(FDR) T x,y,z (mm) Region
0.005 7.71 −12 50 34 Left AMPFC (superior frontal gyrus)
0.005 7.51 −52 −70 18 Left posterior middle and superior temporal gyri
0.005 7.10 −20 10 14 Left caudate head
0.005 5.92 30 −78 −34 Right cerebellum
0.005 5.76 −48 6 −30 Left temporal pole
0.005 5.74 20 16 −2 Right caudate head and anterior acumbens
0.007 5.13 −8 −40 32 Left retrosplenial cortex; RSC
0.009 4.87 −24 −10 −18 Left anterior hippocampus
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